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Peter Berger on the Rise and  
Fall of the Theory of Secularization
Dylan Reaves
Though an interest in modernity may be greater in the overall scheme of his 
work, discussions of secularization are the earliest consistent theme in the writing 
of sociologist and theologian Peter Berger. From his very first book, he shows a 
great deal of interest in the causes of secularization, its effects, and possible ways 
to react to it – even reverse it. However, unlike his stances on many other issues, 
such as modernity and politics, his perspective on secularization has changed 
radically over time. Early in his career, Berger, like most sociologists in the 1960’s, 
believed that secularization was an inevitable byproduct of modernization and 
that religion was slowly fading out of society. As time went on, he and his aca-
demic peers began to realize that not only was this not the case, but nearly the 
opposite was occurring. Religion was (and still is) experiencing resurgences in 
various forms all over the world. Thus, his discussion on secularization goes from 
one of concern with the loss of religion to the task of explaining why his earlier 
predictions did not occur.
The History of Secularization
Berger contends that an explanation of the history and origins of seculariza-
tion is crucial to understanding any argument about it. originally, “secularization” 
simply referred to the removal of land from religious authority.  of course, this 
canon definition is not necessarily a complete view of the implications of the 
word today, as it has taken on radically different and emotionally charged con-
notations for different groups of people. For example, for Christians, seculariza-
tion is sometimes equitable with de-Christianization, heresy, “paganization”, and 
other negative terms, while for modern atheist and agnostic groups, secularization 
is often associated with progress, freedom from religion, and liberation of mind. 
Berger himself defines secularization as “the process by which sectors of society 
and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and sym-
bols” (Berger 1967, 107). Thus, all forms are encompassed, whether that be the 
original meaning involving the loss of land, the more modern cultural shift away 
from “sacred” control, or the resulting shift in consciousness that comes from this 
societal change.
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As a specialist in the sociology of knowledge, Berger seeks to identify the 
building blocks, so to speak, of any major societal thought process. one of the 
most important ways to do this is to understand the “primary carriers” of any 
change in social consciousness. Primary carriers are the institutions and practices 
that are directly responsible for affecting and altering the way people think. Berger 
maintains that those nearest to, most affected by, and most involved in industrial 
society are the ones most affected by secularization. Thus, industrialism itself is 
the primary carrier of secularization. This is a result of numerous factors, including 
the fact that highly industrialized societals typically have more explanations for 
natural phenomena, or as Berger refers to it, “the pervasive influence of science” 
(Berger 1967, 110). It is this connection that is partially responsible for Berger’s 
initial linking of the process of modernization with that of secularization, for in-
dustrialism and technological advancement are primary carriers of both.
In what might be a surprising argument, Berger states that some of the roots 
of secularization lie in Christianity; specifically, in Protestantism. In fact, he asserts 
that there have been secularizing notions coming from Christianity since its earli-
est days, even back into its origins in Judaism. Most recently, this was epitomized 
in the drastic changes brought about by Martin Luther in 1517, during the Prot-
estant Reformation. Essentially, Protestantism removed all of the more ethereal or 
“magical” aspects of Catholicism, whittling the faith down to a more basic level. 
According to this new form of Christian thought, miracles no longer occurred with 
the same frequency, or had the same significance as they once had. Mass, with its 
deep meanings and weekly miracle of transubstantiation (the conversion of bread 
and wine to the actual body and blood of Christ), was done away with entirely. 
All communication with the souls of the dead, or any significance of the saints be-
yond historical interest, was eliminated. Protestants did not believe the world was 
constantly being affected by divine forces; instead, God had a more laissez-faire 
approach, though certainly not to the extent of Deism. The sacred and the profane 
were pulled further from one another, existing in two entirely separate and rarely, 
if ever, connected realities. Many of these beliefs were long held to be essential 
to belief in God, or Christianity. When people began to lose the miraculous and 
transcendent aspects of religion, it became easier and easier to pull away from the 
religion as a whole – in other words, to become secularized. For Protestants, there 
was only one manner of communication with the divine, and only one fragile 
thread connecting an individual with God. When this line of communication fell 
into doubt, the entire foundation of that individual’s beliefs was destroyed.
Going further back into the historical roots of Christianity, even Judaism was 
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extremely secularizing when compared to the faiths of the other cultures that sur-
rounded the early Jews. For other prominent societies around the Israelites, such 
as the Mesopotamians and Egyptians, the sacred was constantly interacting with 
our world. Every major event, every human action, every position of power, was 
as a direct result of the interference of the gods, or their divine will. The world and 
its people existed in connection with, and under the blanket of, the world of their 
divinities. This is another important consideration – there were numerous gods and 
goddesses, all with different personalities and domains of power.
The Judeo-Christian God, on the other hand, is a solitary and omnipotent be-
ing. Unlike the gods of their oppressors, the god of Israel did not exist inside the Is-
raelite’s cosmos, and was instead outside of it. He had not been created along with 
the world; he created it, and was timeless, having no beginning set by any kind of 
creation. This god was not connected to the Israelites by any territorial or “natural” 
law; instead, they were bonded by a pact, a covenant, and were only bonded 
through this historical agreement and resulting obedience. Finally, this new god 
was entirely unaffected by human meddling – no amount of magic or ritual could 
do anything to this omnipotent master. Man’s history became extremely important, 
replacing the mythology of other societies with accounts of great people – King 
David, the prophets, and Esther, for example. All of these factors were extremely 
secularizing, as God is removed from mankind to an extent hitherto unknown in 
other religions. Everything was rationalized, and the early religious leaders made 
sure to purge the faith of many “magical” understandings that had previously been 
standard in religions across the globe. Thus,  from its creation in exceptionally ra-
tional Judaism, to its removal from the retrogress of Catholicism into mysticism as 
a result of the Protestant Reformation, Christianity has had a great deal to do with 
secularization in the cultures it influences.
Secularization and the Modern Church
Though Christianity certainly has many of the roots of secularization, there 
are numerous factors in the modern world contributing to its spread. Most directly 
responsible for this is pluralism, the growing acceptance of having large numbers 
of religions co-existing. This has to do with the Bergerian concept of “legitima-
tions.”  Legitimations are the objectified “knowledge” that explains, and most sig-
nificantly, justifies the social order – in other words, the explanations of why things 
are the way they are. Historically, religion itself is the most legitimating force for 
any given society. As such, a society with only one religion requires very few le-
gitimations and is extremely powerful. However, as more religions are introduced, 
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it becomes increasingly difficult to resist anomic interference, for the legitimations 
of any one religion seem increasingly weak. Additionally, religion can no longer 
rely on the government in a pluralistic society, for all religions are treated equally 
in some manner (whether that be equally oppressed or equally supported). As reli-
gion begins to take on a form more palatable to the everyday citizen of a pluralistic 
society, it becomes increasingly individualistic in order to not interfere with the 
other affairs of this individual. Thus, secularization is furthered in this divide be-
tween private religion and public secularism. Again, there is connection here with 
the process of modernity, for secularization is aided by the public/private division 
that Berger previously cited as a byproduct of modernization.
Berger was very concerned in his early writing with the effect that this would 
have on the church – arguably, his theological standpoints have been influenced 
by this concern ever since he first expressed this fear. He argued that religious 
institutions are aware that the modern world is changing their strength, and as 
a result, are changing the ways in which they interact with society. Bureaucratic 
practices are becoming both more common and more necessary in the churches. 
As they bureaucratize, the different faiths, as well as different sub divisions in each 
faith, become increasingly cooperative. The ecumenical movement, characterized 
as an attempt by the different denominations to come together and consolidate 
some beliefs in order to not be so divided, of the early and mid-20th century is a 
perfect example of this occurrence. When the different denominations begin to 
cooperate in this way, there is naturally some degree of homogenization. Essen-
tially, the faith world itself turns into a marketplace. Religion becomes a commod-
ity, one that gradually changes to fit the demand of the buyer. Indeed, the religious 
bureaucracies can and do begin to form cartels, getting together to metaphorically 
“set prices” on their religious goods and to further collaborate on what to give the 
people.
Ultimately, all these shifting mentalities within the church caused what is 
commonly referred to as the “crisis of theology.” Countless views have surfaced 
and been countered within theology, creating a great deal of disparity and debate 
within the church itself. The liberalism of some is countered by the orthodoxy of 
others, only to be challenged again by a radically secularized version of theology 
itself, with the drastic “death of God” movement. Berger did not say definitively 
what the outcome of this would be. However, it does seem that Berger, in the end, 
believed that the destination of modern society was going to end in the general 
secularization of the world.
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Desecularization
This, however, was not to be his final view. As time passed, Berger began to 
realize that, despite his own predictions and the predictions of the academic com-
munity at large, the world has not been completely secularized. To the contrary, 
he ultimately argues that the world is as religious as ever, and in fact, in some 
cases, is more so now than it was before. This directly disproves the so-called 
secularization theory of the 1950’s and 60’s, as outlined above, which suggested 
that it was an unavoidable fact of modernization that the world would become 
more and more secular. To some extent, he believes that the theory was partially 
right, for modernization has had some overall secularizing effects. But importantly, 
modernization has also led to numerous counter-secularizing efforts. Additionally, 
he notes that “secularization on the societal level is not necessarily linked to secu-
larization on the level of individual consciousness” (Berger 1999, 3).
Reactions to secularization from religion necessarily came in one of two 
forms: rejection, or adaptation. Rejecting the secularized worldview requires 
implementing one of two strategies. First is the strategy of religious revolution, 
wherein a religious institution attempts to take over an entire society and mandate 
the counter-secularization for everyone. This, however, is rarely if ever success-
ful, the closest that exists today being near-theocracies such as the mullahs of 
Iran. The second and more realistically viable strategy is the creation of religious 
subcultures, sectarian groups that try to distance themselves from the influence of 
society at large. Interestingly, this shows that secularization theory was also proved 
wrong in regard to the way the adaptive strategies would be implemented. A strict 
believer in secularization theory would have argued that the success of religious 
institutions would depend on the degree to which they had adapted to secularity. 
To the contrary, in the modern world, religious institutions have tended to succeed 
based on the degree to which they do not adapt to a secular mindset.
In terms of global scale, conservative and orthodox traditionalist movements 
are on the rise more than any other religious mindset. This can certainly be seen 
in the rise in Evangelicalism in American Protestant faith, but moreover, similar 
trends in faith can be found in Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and nearly all other 
major world religions. All could be called “fundamentalist,” and though Berger 
dislikes the term for its pejorative connotation, he does note that they can all be 
unified under certain shared characteristics: “great religious passion, a defiance 
of what others have defined as the Zeitgeist, and a return to traditional sources of 
religious authority” (Berger 1999, 6). Additionally, all can be understood as a reac-
tion against the forces of secularity. He suspects that this is as a result of moder-
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nity itself, for modernity brings with it uncertainty through pluralization and other 
forces; as such, a movement, such as religion, that claims certainty is incredibly 
appealing.
In order to understand this further, Berger attempts a brief examination of 
the two religious upsurges he views as “most dynamic” today – the Islamic and 
Evangelical. The Islamic revival is notably a revival of extremely religious commit-
ments. It is very strong even in highly modern and urban areas of the East, to the 
surprise of what would be the traditional intellectual assumption. It is not even a 
fully uniform revival, for some areas, such as Indonesia, have Islamic movements 
that are outspokenly pro-democracy and pluralism. overall, however, Berger 
would argue that Islam has been severely challenged by facing up to facets of the 
modern world. The Evangelic upsurge is also taking place in a massive geographic 
scope, and interestingly, has taken on a powerfully indigenous growth pattern. 
This underlines one key difference between the Islamic and Evangelical move-
ments, for the former is occurring in already Muslim dominated countries, while 
the latter is growing enormously in areas of the world previously unfamiliar with 
the Christian faith.
There are, of course, exceptions to any rule, and Berger does acknowledge 
that there are two cases that do not directly fit the desecularization thesis. The 
first is Europe, specifically Western Europe, which has become increasingly 
secular as the years go by. It has been suggested, however, that this is not pure 
secularization so much as a shift in the institutional location of religion, for 
while there have been dramatic drops in such factors as church attendance, lev-
els of faith-adherents are debatably stable. The matter is still up for discussion. 
The other exception, which has been subtly hinted at already, is in the Western 
intellectual community, which remains as a whole quite secular – an important 
realization, considering it is often the intellectuals who have a great deal of con-
trol over society as a whole. Berger semi-humorously states “that the American 
intelligentsia has been ‘Europeanized,’ in its attitude to religion as in other mat-
ters” (Berger, Davie and Fokas 2008, 18).
Beyond this wide scope idea of the status of desecularization in the world, 
Berger is interested in many more questions for consideration on the matter. “First, 
what are the origins of the worldwide resurgence of religion?” (Berger 1999, 12). 
Berger has proposed two possible answers; one suggesting that it is a quest for cer-
tainty in the fact of the uncertainty brought about by modernity, and the other that 
it is a rebellion against the secularism of the elite minority. Berger, however, posits 
an intriguing third option for consideration, suggesting that because religion has 
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always been around and has always been a driving force in society, what is more 
in need of explanation is the (possibly brief) appearance of the absence of religion.
After wondering about its roots, a second questions merits attention, “what 
is likely the future course of this religious resurgence?” (Berger 1999, 14) Though 
hesitant to make any concrete predictions, Berger does make the rather bold state-
ment of belief that the 21st century will be just as religious as ever before. Some 
sociologists have contended that this spike in religious movements has been a 
final reaction signalling the beginning of the secular era, but Berger finds this 
doubtful. He does, however, make it clear that the prediction about religion as a 
whole remaining successful in the future does not apply equally to all movements. 
For instance, he suspects that militant Islam will essentially be forced to die down. 
Third, and finally, the question becomes comparative: “Do the resurgent religions 
differ in their critique of the secular order?” (Berger 1999, 15) Put simply, of course 
they do! The Dalai Lama and the Pope will naturally have differing views on the 
matter based on their own faith tradition. Despite this, it does seem that in the end, 
what adherents of almost every faith can all agree upon is that a culture that tries 
to exist without any sort of transcendent viewpoint is a shallow one.
Finally, there are four major areas that Berger argues in which the resurgence 
of religion and the overcoming of secularism could have interesting affects. First 
is international politics. It has been suggested that the wars of the future will be 
predominantly ideological ones, and religion could certainly be an important fac-
tor in that. Though the Cold War is over, Berger hints at the fact that he does not 
believe this invalidates this theory, and that something akin to the Cold War could 
very well happen again. It is, however, significant to note the differences between 
legitimately religiously inspired political movements versus those that use religion 
to legitimate politics based on non-religious interests. Second, and integrally re-
lated, is the issue of war and peace, an issue upon which religion can and often 
is divided between the two sides. Berger acknowledges that religion can be used 
both to support and legitimate warfare and to counter it, advocating instead for 
pacifism and peace. He does not clearly fall on either side when discussing what 
the future role of religion on this matter will be. Third is a matter that sociologists 
have understood as integrally related ever since Max Weber’s famous work on 
Protestantism and capitalism; religion and economic development. The modern-
ization of various countries in the third world, combined with the unique state of 
interconnectivity found in the modern world, has created an environment for these 
developing countries which has never before been seen. Religious resurgence or 
counter secularization could be either a bane or blessing for this process, and 
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without a historical example to judge by, it is nearly impossible to decide which. 
Fourth and finally are the matters of human rights and social justice, where mat-
ters are often complicated as important national decisions are made on a clearly 
religious influence.
Conclusion
Berger’s discussion of secularization has a deep importance on countless lev-
els. Both religious and non-religious individuals can benefit from understanding 
this incredibly important, and rapidly changing, dynamic of our society. Those 
who do have faith would do well to understand the role that religion itself had in 
secularization, as well as to understand what causes it – if the goal is to try to stop 
it. on the other hand, those who want a secularized world have much to gain from 
understanding the process of desecularization, if for no other reason than to try to 
change the minds of the masses on a more fundamental level.
of course, one does not have to take anything Berger says on the matter 
with a reaction of fear or dogmatism. It is entirely possible to read on the matter 
with nothing more than an interest in understanding a major component of the 
functioning of the modern world. But to do this seems irresponsible, and against 
Berger’s intention. He frequently suggests that the role of anyone attempting a so-
ciological understanding of society is to try to make sure that society is accurately 
understood so that those who want change can make it. As elucidated above, the 
process of secularization and desecularization is not self-contained and will not 
only affect the religious community. To the contrary, it will have far reaching effects 
in global policy issues and shape the way humans interact with one another on 
every societal level. Thus, even if one chooses not to argue for the virtues of one 
side or the other, in the end, every person should have an understanding of how 
these factors could affect their own lives, and the lives of the rest of the world.
BiBliogRApHy
Berger, Brigitte, Peter Berger and Hansfried Kellner. 1973. The Homeless Mind. New 
york: Random House.
Berger, Peter L. 1961a. The Precarious Vision; a sociologist looks at social fictions and 
Christian faith.. Garden City: Doubleday.
Berger, Peter L. 1961b. The Noise of Solemn Assemblies. Garden City: Doubleday.
Berger, Peter L. 1963. An Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective. Garden 
City: Doubleday.
Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality. 
Garden City: Doubleday.
Berger, Peter L. 1967. The Sacred Canopy. Garden City: Doubleday.
8
Denison Journal of Religion, Vol. 11 [2012], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.denison.edu/religion/vol11/iss1/3
PETER BERGER oN THE RISE AND FALL oF THE THEoRy oF SECULARIZATIoN
Berger, Peter L. 1969. A Rumor of Angels. Garden City: Doubleday.
Berger, Peter L. 1974. Pyramids of Sacrifice. New york: Basic Books.
Berger, Peter L. 1977. Facing Up to Modernity. New york: Basic Books.
Berger, Peter L. 1979. The Heretical Imperative. Garden City: Doubleday.
Berger, Peter L. 1994. Questions of Faith – A Skeptical Affirmation of Christianity. 
Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
Berger, Peter L. 1997. Redeeming Laughter: The Comic Dimension of Human Experi-
ence. New york: Walter De Gruyter.
Berger, Peter L. ed. 1999. The Desecularization of the World. Grand Rapids: William 
B. Eerdman’s.
Berger, Peter L., Effie Fokas and Grace Davie. 2008. Religious America, Secular Eu-
rope? Burlington: Ashgate.
Berger, Peter L. and Anton Zijderveld. 2009. In Praise of Doubt. New york: Harper 
Collins.
Berger, Peter L. 2010. ed. Between Relativism and Fundamentalism. Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans.
19 9
Reaves: Peter Berger and the Rise and Fall of the Theory of Secularizatio
Published by Denison Digital Commons, 2012
